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1. Introduction 
Every firm is exposed to business risks, including the possibilities of large, adverse shocks.  
Potential sources for such shocks abound – examples include new technologies that reduce barriers to 
entry, disruptive product innovations, the relaxation of international trade barriers, and changes in 
government regulation.  Risks of such shocks are thought to fundamentally affect firms’ choices 
regarding financing, investment, payout policy, and managerial compensation (e.g., Modigliani and 
Miller 1958; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers 1977; Grossman and Hart 1983).   Some firms may adjust 
their business and financial strategies to reduce their exposure to these risks.  Such actions, including 
growth, operational diversification, and reducing leverage, can create value for shareholders if they help 
reduce the possibility of costly financial distress (Maksimovic and Phillips 2002).  Reducing these risks 
may also benefit managers personally by reducing their personal risk exposure (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Amihud and Lev 1981; Holmström 1999). 
Although theory suggests that business risks play a central role in financial and investment 
policies, there is little empirical evidence of how firms actually respond to such risks.  Empirical evidence 
is sparse in part because of the difficulty of isolating an exogenous shock to firms’ business prospects that 
does not also affect other aspects of the firms, such as their current cash flows.  Our paper overcomes this 
challenge by exploiting exogenous increases in legal liability that boost firms’ (and managers’) exposure 
to the risk of poor future corporate performance and even bankruptcy.  By investigating firms’ responses 
to these specific kinds of shocks, we shed light on how firms’ investment and financing choices respond 
to business risks.  
In particular, we focus on the legal liability that is created when a chemical to which a firm’s 
workers are already exposed is newly identified as a carcinogen.  Using this approach, we analyze how 
2,209 firms in more than 100 SIC industries between 1980 and 2006 responded to the identification of 
121 different chemicals as carcinogens.   Despite the presence of the workers’ compensation system, 
these exposures can carry significant corporate legal liability (Ringleb and Wiggins 1990).  Discovery of 
a chemical’s carcinogenicity increases the likelihood that a firm will need to spend large sums on legal 
fees, damage payments, and insurance premiums in the future – if and when workers eventually fall ill.  
This increased potential for large cash outflows increases the likelihood of future poor corporate 
performance and financial distress, allowing us to cleanly identify a shock to firms’ business prospects. 
The most salient risk for these firms is that a chemical will become the next asbestos.  
Widespread workplace exposure to asbestos, whose medical dangers were known as early as the 1920s 
(well before the sample period of this study), have come to be regarded as “the worst occupational health 
disaster in U.S. history” (White 2004; Cauchon 1999).  Litigation related to asbestos exposure has 
targeted more than 8,400 corporate defendants, has bankrupted at least 85 firms, and is projected to cost 
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defendants $200 to $265 billion in total (Carroll et al. 2005; White 2004).  Although the expected liability 
costs of a newly identified carcinogen are unlikely to approach those of asbestos, there is a chance that a 
firm that has exposed its workers to a carcinogen will be liable for a substantial payout.   
The dominant finding of our analysis is that firms tend to undertake a period of aggressive growth 
via both capital investment and acquisitions after experiencing an adverse liability shock.  Although firms 
that become exposed to the increased legal liability are very similar to other firms before the shock 
(including in size, market-to-book ratio, growth rate, financial leverage, payout rates, and other 
characteristics), exposed firms grow to become about 10 percent larger, on average, than unexposed firms 
within a few years following the shock.  The exposed firms finance their growth primarily with equity, 
causing modest decreases in average leverage ratios, and the growth is concentrated among firms that 
seem to be more vulnerable to the realization of an adverse shock.  For example, firms at high risk of 
bankruptcy (measured by Altman z-score) grow by an average of 38 to 48 percent more than otherwise 
similar firms after the increased liability is discovered.  Firms at low risk of bankruptcy show no average 
growth.  The growth is also associated with other indicators of financial vulnerability such as high 
leverage, low operating cash flows, zero dividends, and small overall size.   
While some of the growth is achieved by an increase in capital expenditures, at least half stems 
from an increase in acquisitions.  The discovery of a new carcinogen is associated with a 6 percent 
increase in the total number of acquisitions completed in exposed industries, and many of these 
acquisitions diversify the firms’ assets away from those causing the liability.  In comparison with 
acquisitions undertaken by similar firms without such liability exposure, the targets acquired by the 
exposed firms can be described as “cash cows”: they are, on average, 39 percent larger and have 
relatively high operating cash flows, recent growth, and total payout rates.  Relative to acquisitions by 
firms without liability exposure, the exposed firms pay a 13.7-percentage-point greater takeover premium 
on average, and announcements of the deals are associated with abnormal returns on the acquirers’ equity 
that average 1.3 percentage points lower. 
These responses to the liability shock suggest that the firms are attempting to reduce their 
probability of future financial distress arising from the increased liability risk.  Growing a firm by 
building or acquiring businesses with strong prospects for producing high cash flows provides the firm 
with deeper pockets from which to pay future liability costs.  This may increase the total potential damage 
claims, but it is also likely to reduce the probability of financial distress.  Funding the growth with equity 
rather than debt further lowers the probability of financial distress.  Consistent with this motivation, the 
growth is concentrated among firms with already weak balance sheets before the shock, leaving them 
more vulnerable to financial distress. 
There are multiple reasons why firms might seek to reduce the probability of financial distress 
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after liability risk increases.  First, if financial distress is costly, it may be in the interest of shareholders to 
grow or even diversify to avoid incurring these costs should the firm end up being liable for substantial 
damages.  In order for the growth to benefit shareholders, the avoided costs of financial distress must be 
greater than the potential costs of diversification (Berger and Ofek, 1995, Lang and Stulz 1994) and any 
value lost from exposing the assets of the newly-acquired businesses to liability from the shock.  A 
second possibility is that the growth is motivated by managers’ personal exposure to their firms’ risk.  
Managers who earn private benefits from maintaining control have an incentive to direct their firms to 
take costly investments that ensure the firms’ long-run survival with themselves at the helm (Holmström 
1999).  From a purely financial perspective, a risk-averse manager who has a large fraction of his 
personal wealth tied to the firm also gains more from reducing idiosyncratic liability risk to the firms’ 
stock price than does a diversified shareholder (Hugonnier and Morellec 2007).   
Additional results support the idea that agency motivations play a role in firms’ responses to the 
shock.  First, the negative average announcement returns associated with the acquisitions suggest that 
much of the growth is not in the interest of shareholders.  Second, managers who grow their firms 
significantly in response to the liability are less likely to later lose their positions as CEO.  Third, we find 
that firms’ responses to the shock are related to various indicators for the degree of risk-related agency 
conflicts at these firms, specifically the strength of external governance (Jensen and Ruback 1983; 
Shleifer and Vishny 1989), the size of senior management’s ownership stake in the firm (Parrino, 
Poteshman, and Weisbach 2005), and the degree of institutional equity ownership (Shleifer and Vishny 
1986).  We find that total assets grow by almost 35 percent after the shock at firms with weak external 
governance.  Firm growth is also larger when senior management holds a larger equity stake in the firm, 
which increases their exposure to the firm’s idiosyncratic risk, and when relatively few equity shares are 
held by institutional investors, who are thought to be more effective at monitoring managers.  At the same 
time, firms with strong external governance, low inside ownership, and high institutional ownership do 
not grow.  Instead, they increase their payouts to shareholders, suggesting that increasing payouts rather 
than growth is shareholders’ preferred response to the liability shock.1   
Collectively, these results suggest that the risk of large, adverse shocks has the potential to 
dramatically affect corporate decisions and that managers’ incentive to reduce their downside risk may 
play a role in these decisions.  Our analysis complements cross-country comparisons presented by 
Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2008), who find that firms are more likely to undertake diversifying 
                                                            
1 In theory, such an increase in payouts would benefit shareholders as long as costs of financial distress were not too 
high.  To the extent that the liability shock decreases the returns on new investments, an optimizing firm in a 
frictionless world would reduce investments and increase payouts, all the more so if excess corporate liquidity 
increases expected damage awards.  By diverting capital from potential damage claims, investors in that model can 
redeploy these funds more profitably to other firms that are not exposed to the liability. 
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acquisitions and less risky investments in countries with stronger creditor rights, particularly rights that 
increase the likelihood of managers’ removal in periods of financial distress.2  Our evidence is also 
consistent with Tufano (1996, 1998) and Low (forthcoming), who argue that agency conflicts may be 
related to firms’ risk management choices and stock volatility.  In contrast to these papers, our paper 
provides evidence on how agency conflicts can affect firm financing and investment choices and shows 
for which firms this distortion appears to be more severe.   
Our study also provides a complement to Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer’s (1994) 
examination of how eleven firms spend cash windfalls from lawsuits.  Broadly speaking, firms have 
access to cash flows and investment opportunities.  Whereas Blanchard et al. investigate the effect of an 
increase in cash flows that has little effect on investment opportunities, the analysis presented here 
examines the effect of a decrease in investment opportunities that has little effect on cash flows.  In 
essence, both papers examine the impact of increasing the wedge between corporate cash flows and 
investment opportunities, and both papers find evidence that seems to fit an agency model of managerial 
behavior.  Case studies of declining industries also point to managerial agency conflicts (e.g., Dial and 
Murphy 1995; Jensen 1986).  However, while the empirical strategies employed by these other papers 
limit their analysis to only a handful of firms, our conclusions are based on the behavior of 2,209 affected 
firms.  The size of our sample also allows us to perform formal statistical hypothesis tests and to explore 
how and why firms’ responses to adverse shocks may vary. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses firms’ legal liability for 
occupational carcinogens and how it is likely to affect the firms’ cash flows and investment opportunities.  
Section 3 describes our empirical strategy and the data sources.  Section 4 presents our results, and 
Section 5 discusses possible explanations.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Liability for occupational carcinogens 
In the United States, diseases – including cancers – that are contracted by workers in the course of 
employment are covered by a legal institution known as the workers’ compensation system.  Under this 
system, employers are required to compensate workers for all job-related injuries irrespective of fault, and 
the injured workers are not eligible to sue their employers for negligence (for this reason, workers’ 
compensation is called workers’ “exclusive remedy”).  Upon establishing that employment was at least a 
contributing factor in causing a disease, workers typically qualify for payment of their complete medical 
expenses as well as some compensation for lost wages (Peirce and Dworkin 1988).  Because these 
payments accrue irrespective of employer negligence, the firm bears liability even if it had no knowledge 
of the danger (Schwartz 1985). 
                                                            
2 Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2008) also find that there is less innovation in countries where it is easier to 
terminate employees. 
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Damages related to carcinogenic exposures in the workplace can be significant.  Treating cancer 
is expensive, and if a worker dies from the disease, surviving family members often qualify for death 
benefits.  Furthermore, sick workers and their family members are entitled to sue employers directly for 
negligence, pain and suffering, and punitive damages if they can prove that their employer had “dual 
capacity” (for example, if the employer was also the producer of the substance causing the carcinogenic 
exposure) or committed “willful misconduct” (for example, if the employer took few precautions despite 
knowing the risks of exposure).  Even a few such suits can lead to significant damage awards, and 
numerous suits can tax the financial assets of even large corporations (Ringleb and Wiggins 1990).   
Thus, the discovery of the carcinogenicity of a chemical to which a firm’s workers are exposed 
spells bad news for the firm.  First, the probability of a severe future cash flow shock increases.  This 
increases the likelihood of future financial distress and bankruptcy and decreases the value of the firm’s 
assets.  Second, the liability shock decreases the returns on new investments.  Greater expected liability 
costs effectively raise the marginal costs of production: incremental carcinogenic exposure incurred with 
each unit of production increases the expected value of future damage awards.   
Large firms often self-insure against these risks, thereby retaining the primary liability (LeRoy et 
al. 1989), and general liability and workers’ compensation insurance are likely to provide firms with only 
limited protection from these claims.  Third-party policies are often limited in scope and do not provide 
the firm with any protection against future premium increases due to changes in the firm’s risk exposure, 
and the premiums can become a significant cost of doing business (Williams 1986; Cummins and Olson 
1974).3,4  For example, a half-dozen surgeries for carpal tunnel problems and other injuries at a factory of 
220 workers can lead to costs representing 2.5 percent of revenue ($4,900 per worker per year, or $2.50 
for every hour that an employee works; Greenhouse 2009). 
Using subsidiary corporate structures is also unlikely to shield firms from any major liability 
emerging from these claims because courts can “pierce the corporate veil” and hold a parent corporation 
responsible for its subsidiaries’ liabilities.  While there is no set rule or formula, it is generally understood 
                                                            
3 Because of concerns about strong adverse selection, surplus liability insurance policies covering large risks were 
often unavailable during the period of this study, and insurance policies that were issued typically excluded many 
risks including “tail coverage” (i.e., the policies covered only damages from lawsuits actually filed during the policy 
period, excluding losses that would not manifest until much later; Winter 1991).   
4 Firms also warn about this risk in their financial reporting: “Our manufacturing operations are subject 
to…environmental hazards such as chemical spills, discharges or releases of toxic or hazardous substances or gases 
into the environment or workplace.… Furthermore, we could be subject to present and future claims with respect to 
workplace exposure, workers’ compensation and other matters.  Although we maintain property and casualty 
insurance of the types and in the amounts that we believe are customary for our industries, we cannot assure you that 
our insurance coverage will be adequate for liability that may be ultimately incurred or that such coverage will 
continue to be available to us on commercially reasonable terms.  Any claims that result in liability exceeding our 
insurance coverage could have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.” 
(Northwest Pipe Company 10-Q, September 2006, p. 18) 
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that liability will be imposed on the parent “when it is necessary to promote justice or to obviate 
inequitable results” (Lattin 1971, p. 72), or when a subsidiary is set up to avoid paying foreseeable 
damages (because it is undercapitalized; Thompson 1991).  Furthermore, using a subsidiary structure in 
the occupational injury context may actually increase the firm’s total liability, because the exclusive 
remedy provisions of the workers’ compensation system do not usually transfer to the parent corporation 
(Treece and Zuckerman 1983).  Firms also cannot shield themselves from existing liability by spinning 
off the troubled assets.  Although selling the assets can prevent additional expenses, the firms would still 
be liable to workers for damages already incurred. 
Although the liability shock is bad news about the firm’s future, it is unlikely to have much of an 
effect on its current cash flows.  Damage awards are unlikely to affect cash flows right away because 
claims for past exposure to carcinogens typically take years to litigate.  Moreover, damage payments to 
workers typically only accrue after worker injuries manifest themselves, because damages are usually 
assessed only for actual – not speculative – damages (Ringleb and Wiggins 1990).  Although premiums 
for third-party workers’ compensation insurance are likely to eventually reflect the increased risk of a 
payout, they are unlikely to adjust right away (Williams 1986).5   
The discovery that a chemical currently being used in a firm’s production process – and to which 
the firm’s workers are exposed – is a carcinogen thus has a distinctive feature: it represents a substantial 
adverse shock to a firm’s asset value and investment opportunities that increases the likelihood of future 
financial distress and bankruptcy but has minimal concomitant effect on cash flows.  Because the shock 
has little effect on current cash flows, which might directly influence investment (Fazzari, Hubbard, and 
Petersen 1988), we are able to isolate an exogenous increase in a firm’s business risk.  We exploit this 
unique feature in the analysis that follows to explore how firms’ financing and investment decisions are 
affected by the risk of a large, adverse shock. 
3. Empirical approach 
Identifying workers’ exposure to newly identified carcinogens requires the combination of 
information on (1) scientific discoveries related to chemical carcinogenicity and (2) which firms use these 
chemicals.  For information about the timing of discoveries, we use the National Toxicology Program’s 
(NTP) Report on Carcinogens (RoC).  This report, which is published regularly by the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services under a 1978 congressional mandate, contains a list of all substances (1) 
that are known or may reasonably be anticipated to be human carcinogens, and (2) to which a significant 
                                                            
5 After learning about the increased risk, workers might demand higher wages as a sort of insurance against potential 
noneconomic harm, such as from pain and suffering.  (Economic damages and lost wages would be covered by 
workers’ compensation.)  However, using the difference-in-difference framework described below, we do not find 
any evidence of wages increasing after the shock.  Similar tests presented below find no immediate change in the 
ratio of cash flow to assets. 
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number of persons residing in the United States are exposed.  Nominations for listing in the report are 
evaluated by scientists from the NTP, other federal health research and regulatory agencies, and non-
government institutions.  The first two reports were published in 1980 and 1981, and the report has been 
updated approximately biannually since.  
The addition of an agent to the RoC indicates an accumulation of new scientific evidence that the 
agent may be a carcinogen.  In our empirical work, we focus on additions to the RoC after 1981 for two 
reasons.  First, the initial report in 1980, which listed only 26 agents, was an incomplete listing of known 
carcinogens at that time; the second report, released only one year later, in 1981, contained 62 additional 
agents.6  Second, our data source (described below) for identifying firms’ chemical exposures is based on 
information collected between 1981 and 1983.  To avoid the possibility that firms may have already 
eliminated exposures to carcinogens identified in the two reports prior to the survey, we rely on additions 
to the RoC beginning in 1983.  This leaves 121 unique chemical agents. 
While there are a number of potential sources for scientific developments related to possible 
carcinogens, we use the RoC because federal regulations specifically require U.S. firms to monitor the 
report and treat any substances listed as carcinogens.  For example, firms are required to warn employees 
about their exposure to substances that are included in the RoC [U.S. Government Regulation 29 CFR, 
parts 1910.1200(b)(1) and (d)(4)].  Because of such regulations, it is likely that firms, and presumably 
employees, are aware of agents listed in the report.  In fact, although it is not required, firms often note 
relevant changes in the RoC in their financial reporting.  Nevertheless the listing of a substance in the 
RoC is not in itself a regulatory action that requires firms to limit exposures or uses of the substance in 
question, although it may prompt regulatory agencies to consider adopting such rules. 
To identify firms in which workers were likely to have been exposed to the newly identified 
carcinogens, we use the National Occupational Exposure Survey (NOES). This survey was conducted by 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health using on-site visits to 4,490 U.S. business 
establishments employing approximately 1.8 million workers between 1981 and 1983.  In these visits, 
surveyors recorded all chemical, physical, and biological agents to which workers were observed to be 
exposed in each firm, the number of workers being exposed to each agent, and the number of these 
exposures that were uncontrolled.  The survey is expansive and lists nearly 13,000 different agents, 
including agents that were not known or thought to be hazardous at the time of the survey.7  We obtained 
                                                            
6 In the interest of “expeditiously initiating issuance of the first report,” the decision was made to include only a 
limited number of chemicals that “represent substances historically viewed as associated with cancer in man” based 
on existing monographs prepared by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (National Toxicology 
Program 1980, pp. vi, 7).  Subsequent reports also included chemicals recently identified as carcinogens, usually 
through animal studies. 
7 Because the NOES survey was conducted between 1981 and 1983, it measures worker exposures to possible 
carcinogens before those chemicals were identified as dangerous by the RoC.  Although it is possible that changes in 
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a custom extract of this data aggregated by 4-digit 1972 SIC code, covering 522 industries. 
We determine whether a firm is affected by the listing of a newly classified carcinogen based on 
the firm’s SIC code in Compustat in the year prior to each new listing.8  We consider a firm affected if it 
operates in a 4-digit SIC code where at least 7.5 percent of workers were observed to be exposed to the 
carcinogen in NOES. The cutoff of 7.5 percent captures roughly the top quartile of observed exposures at 
the industry level, corresponding to the discoveries that are most likely to result in an increase in legal 
liability.  Our findings are robust to using alternative measures of exposure, including lowering the 
exposure threshold or restricting treatment only to industries with observed “uncontrolled” exposures in 
the NOES.  Our data on firms are from Compustat.  To ensure a consistent sample of observations across 
specifications, we exclude observations with missing values for ln(assets), ln(sales), ln(capital 
expenditures+1), equity, ln(debt+1), and ln(dividends+1).   
Figure 1 displays the timing of the liability shocks and the number of firms affected in each year.  
Using our measure of workers’ exposures, shocks occurred in 1983, 1985, 1989, 1991, 2000, and 2004, 
with more than 100 firms affected by newly identified carcinogens in each of those years.  In all, 106 
different industries and 2,209 firms, representing 12 percent of non-financial firms covered by Compustat 
during the sample period, are affected by a newly identified carcinogen.9  In addition to being robust to 
using alternative measures of workers’ exposures, our findings are robust to excluding any chemical or 
any year in which a set of liability shocks occurred, including 1989. 
For each new chemical’s listing in the RoC, we construct a comparison group of unaffected firms 
(firms without observed exposures to any newly listed carcinogens) that were present in Compustat in the 
year prior to the RoC listing and were in the same Fama-French 48 industry classification as one of the 
affected firms.  (Fama-French industries are collections of 4-digit SIC industries that are meant to 
represent broader industry categories.)  This yields a comparison sample of 8,373 unexposed firms in 249 
industries. Our results are also robust to using all unaffected firms in Compustat as our comparison group 
or to using 2-digit SIC codes instead of Fama and French (1997) industry classifications.   
Firms with exposures to the newly identified carcinogens are very similar to our sample of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
production technologies between 1983 and a chemical’s later listing in the RoC may have eliminated use of the 
dangerous chemical prior to the chemical’s listing in the RoC, firms would still be liable for past exposures that 
occurred while the chemical was still in use.  To the remaining extent that we do misclassify worker exposures, this 
sort of measurement error would only attenuate our estimates.  
8 We measure exposures at the industry level because data on exposures at the firm level are not available.  The 
firm’s SIC code in Compustat reflects its primary industry.  Although it is possible that some firms have small 
operations in other industries causing us to miss some exposed firms, this only works against us finding an effect.   
9 Compustat covers 18,413 non-financial firms between 1982 and 2006, of which 2,209 firms experience an 
exposure.  In an average year, 1.87 percent of previously unexposed firms suffer a new exposure. 
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unexposed firms in the year before the listing of a new carcinogen.   The ex-ante characteristics of firms 
with exposures are reported in column (i) of Table I, and the ex-ante characteristics of firms without 
exposures are reported in column (ii).  Even though we match firms based only on Fama-French 
industries, the two groups are similar in size, market-to-book ratio, recent growth, age, leverage, payout 
policy, capital intensity, and cash balances.  We are unable to reject the null hypothesis that firms 
experiencing a liability shock are similar to other firms in all of these dimensions. 
There is also no evidence of any relationship between the liability shock and current cash flows. 
Average cash flows for exposed and unexposed firms in the year before, the year of, and the year after 
new carcinogen listings are reported in Table II.  In all three years, we are unable to reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference in average cash flows between affected and unaffected firms.  This 
evidence supports the interpretation that the effects of the liability shock are caused by changes in the risk 
of a large adverse shock, rather than changes in current cash flows. 
To estimate firms’ responses to the liability shock, we compare changes in the exposed and 
unexposed firms’ behavior around the time of each new carcinogen listing in the RoC.  For each year that 
new carcinogens are listed in the RoC, we construct a cohort of exposed and unexposed firms using firm-
year observations for the ten years before and the ten years after the listing.  (We obtain similar findings if 
we instead compare the five years before with the five years after each listing.)  We then pool the data 
across cohorts (i.e., across all new carcinogens listings) and estimate the average treatment effect.  
Specifically, we estimate the following firm-panel regression:   
 0 1 ,ijct jct ic tc ijcty Exposure          (1) 
where y is one of several dependent variables of interest for firm i and year t, and Exposure is an indicator 
that equals 1 if at least 7.5 percent of employees in cohort c and industry j were observed to be exposed in 
the NOES to a known RoC carcinogen as of year t.  For an exposed firm, this indicator changes from 0 to 
1 when the chemical is identified in the RoC as a carcinogen.  We also include firm-cohort fixed 
effects, ic , to ensure that we estimate the impact of exposure after controlling for any fixed differences 
between firms; and we include year-cohort fixed effects, tc , as a nonparametric control for any secular 
time trends.  We allow the firm and year fixed effects to vary by cohort, because this approach is more 
conservative than including simple fixed effects.  (Similar results are obtained in both specifications.)  We 
deliberately do not control for any time-varying accounting variables in these regressions because these 
variables are likely affected by the shock and including them would confound estimates of 1 .10  In any 
                                                            
10 Our identification assumption is that the incidence of the liability shock is as good as randomly assigned within 
our industry-matched sample; i.e., which firms’ chemicals are discovered to be carcinogenic is uncorrelated with 
other determinants of the dependent variables after controlling for firm and year fixed effects.  The results presented 
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event, including the standard controls does not qualitatively affect the results (see appendix tables).  To 
account for potential covariance among firm outcomes within the same 4-digit SIC code and over time, 
we cluster the standard errors at the industry level.   
4. Results 
4.1 Firm size, investment, and payout policy 
To assess how the risk of large, adverse shocks can affect firms’ investment and financing 
choices, we first analyze how overall firm growth responds to the liability shock.  Theory suggests that 
firms may respond to increased business risks with diversifying growth (Maksimovic and Phillips 2002; 
Jensen and Meckling 1976; Amihud and Lev 1981).  Such growth can reduce the possibility of costly 
financial distress and possibly benefit both managers and shareholders.   Estimates of the shock’s effect 
on log assets, log sales, and log capital expenditures are reported in Table III.   
We find that, on average, firms grow following the shock.  The estimates for log assets, reported 
in column (i), indicate that, after the liability shock, exposed firms grow total assets by an average of 10.3 
percentage points more than unexposed firms.11  One possibility is that this increase in assets reflects 
firms making investments in order to protect their workers from exposure to the newly identified 
carcinogens.  However, we find that sales at these firms increase by a similar margin [column (ii)], 
suggesting that these firms are increasing their overall size and not strictly making capital investments to 
protect workers.  These results are also not caused by survivorship bias.  We find that firms affected and 
unaffected by the liability shock drop out of the sample at similar rates. The estimates are also robust to 
including controls for cash flows and the market-to-book ratio (see Appendix Table A-I). 
The timing of the increase in size coincides with the increase in legal liability.  Figure 2 plots the 
point estimates from a modified version of equation (1), where we allow the effect of Exposure to vary by 
year from five years before the shock through ten years after.12  There is no indication of a difference in 
growth prior to the liability shock; exposed firms do not appear to be more or less likely to grow or shrink 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
in Table I support this assumption.  In this framework, β1 in equation (1) measures the increase in the dependent 
variable caused by the liability shock.  If we include endogenous controls, then β1 would instead measure only the 
portion of the increase in the dependent variable caused by the liability shock that is not also correlated with the 
causal impact of the liability shock on the other variables.  For example, suppose the liability shock leads firms to 
double in size by increasing capital expenditures by the same amount; then a regression of firm size on the exposure 
indicator and capital expenditures would yield a coefficient on the exposure indicator that is close to zero – even 
though exposure caused substantial growth. 
11 The increase in log assets is 0.098 log points, corresponding to an increase in assets of 0.098 1e   10.3 percentage 
points.  We use this method throughout the paper to interpret estimates from regressions with log dependent 
variables. 
12 The plotted coefficients measure the change in log assets (from its level six to ten years before the shock) for 
affected firms relative to other firms.  The confidence intervals shown have much less power than estimates from 
equation (1) because they compare each year separately against the reference period.   
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relative to other firms prior to the shock.  But after the shock, firms with exposure to a newly identified 
carcinogen tend to grow their assets more than other firms.  This growth begins during the year of the 
shock and continues for about two to three years.  The precise timing of the growth suggests that it is in 
fact caused by the liability shock, rather than by any omitted firm or industry characteristic. 
The growth’s magnitude is also related to the degree of firms’ liability exposure.  If the growth is 
indeed caused by the newfound legal liability, then it should be greater among firms where more 
employees are exposed to carcinogens, such as in firms with more low-skilled labor.  We verify this 
relation using data from the NOES on the fraction of employees exposed to each chemical.  Figure 3 plots 
estimates from a modified version of equation (1), where we allow the effect of Exposure to vary non-
parametrically with the fraction of employees exposed.  As expected, the increase in growth is positively 
related to the degree of firms’ exposure to potential liability.  The estimates indicate that the average 
growth in log assets following a liability shock increases initially with the fraction of employees with 
observed exposures, and then levels off with greater amounts of exposure.   
To shed some light on how firms fund this aggressive growth, we examine the effect of the 
liability shock on log book equity, log debt, and the ratio of debt to assets.  These results are reported in 
columns (i)-(iii) of Table IV.  We find that the exposed firms are more likely to fund their growth with 
equity than with debt.  Similar to the firm’s assets and sales, the overall equity of the firm increases by 11 
percent on average after the liability shock, and this increase is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level.  Total debt, however, does not exhibit a statistically significant increase, leaving firms with lower 
average ratios of debt to assets after the liability shock.   
The increase in liability risk also affects payouts to shareholders.  We define total payouts to 
shareholders as the sum of dividends and repurchases per hundred dollars of total assets and re-estimate 
equation (1).  The estimates, reported in column (iv) of Table IV, find an average increase in overall 
payouts to shareholders.  Total payouts per hundred dollars of assets increase by 30 percentage points – or 
roughly 16 percent relative to the sample mean reported in Table I.  Both the leverage and payout results 
are robust to including typical controls, including the proportion of fixed assets, log sales, modified 
Altman z-score, and ROA (see Appendix Table A-II). 
At first examination, it may seem odd that firms respond to the shock by both issuing equity and 
increasing payouts to shareholders.  Further analysis presented below illustrates that these average 
responses actually obscure substantial heterogeneity: we find that some firms grow while others are more 
likely to pay out capital.   Furthermore, we will show that the liability shock tends to increase firms’ 
growth through the acquisition of high-cash-flow firms.  Rather than these firms necessarily increasing 
their payouts from their existing lines of business, much of any increased payout may be coming from 
these newly acquired business units. 
  12
4.2 Connection with financial vulnerability 
We next examine whether firms’ responses to the shock are related to their ability to survive an 
adverse shock.  In particular, we examine whether firms that are potentially more exposed to an adverse 
shock, as measured by a greater bankruptcy risk, respond differently to the shock.  To do this, we 
calculate each firm’s modified-Altman z-score in the year prior to each new listing in the RoC and then 
compare the response of exposed firms in the lowest quartile (highest bankruptcy risk) with that of 
unexposed firms in the same quartile, and then do the same comparison for firms in the highest quartile 
(lowest bankruptcy risk).13  These results are reported in Table V.  
We find that firms with high risk of bankruptcy tend to respond to the increase in liability risk by 
increasing growth sharply, whereas firms with relatively little bankruptcy risk do not.  As reported in 
Panel A of Table V, column (i), exposed firms with the greatest bankruptcy risk grow total assets by 38 
percent and sales by 48 percent, on average, after the liability shock relative to unexposed firms with 
similar bankruptcy risk.  Firms with low bankruptcy risk, as reported in Panel B, do not exhibit any 
increase in growth, and the difference in growth between high- and low-risk firms is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level for both assets and sales.  The estimates also suggest that capital 
expenditures increase more for high-risk firms: there is an average increase of 13 percent for affected 
high-risk firms and no significant increase for low-risk firms.14  Similar to the full sample, the timing of 
the growth among firms with a high risk of bankruptcy largely coincides with the publication of a new 
carcinogen in the RoC and does not seem to reflect a pre-existing trend (See Appendix Figure A-1). 
To further test whether a firm’s financial vulnerability affects its response, we divide the sample 
based on other measures of financial constraints.  Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997), we use the 
following proxies: high leverage, low cash flows, zero dividends, and small size.  Similar to before, we 
match firms within cohorts to compare the differential responses of firms in the top and bottom quartiles 
for each variable, except for dividends, for which we compare those firms that paid dividends with those 
firms that did not.  In all cases we measure the variable in the year prior to the liability shock.  Estimates 
of the shock’s effect on exposed firms’ average log assets are reported in Table VI. 
Similar to our analysis of bankruptcy risk, we find that firms that are more financially vulnerable 
to the adverse shock and thereby less able to bear liability risk tend to respond to the shock by growing, 
whereas less vulnerable firms do not.  As reported in Table VI, firms with high leverage, low cash flows, 
zero dividends, or small size in the year prior to a liability shock exhibit an average increase in growth of 
                                                            
13 Following MacKie-Mason (1990), we calculate a modified-Altman z-score as 3.3*(EBIT/assets)+1.0*(sales/ 
assets) +1.4*(retained earnings/assets)+1.2*(working capital/assets).  Including the ratio of market equity to book 
debt decreases our sample size by about 20 percent.  Instead, we examine the effect of leverage separately in Table 
VI.   
14 These results are robust to dividing the sample between liability shocks that occur before and after 1989 (see 
Appendix Tables A-III and A-IV). 
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about 19 to 23 percent.  These increases are all statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  On the other 
hand, firms with low leverage, high cash flows, positive dividends, and more assets do not exhibit a 
statistically significant increase in average growth following the shock.   
4.3 Acquisitions 
Why do firms grow after the shock?  One reason may be to reduce the probability of future 
financial distress (Maksimovic and Phillips 2002; Amihud and Lev 1981).  To shed light on the 
motivations behind the growth, we examine the extent and nature of acquisition activity undertaken by 
exposed firms after the shock.  The magnitude and quickness of the growth of financially vulnerable firms 
after the liability shock suggest that acquisitions may play an important role in this growth.  The 
availability of detailed data on corporate acquisitions also enables us to analyze whether the liability 
shock affects the types of investments undertaken by exposed firms and whether these investments tend to 
diversify firms operations. 
 To analyze the liability shock’s effect on acquisitions, we obtain the sample of all acquisitions of 
U.S. firms or subsidiaries that are recorded in the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers and 
Acquisitions Database.  The sample includes all acquisitions announced between 1980 and 2006.  
Following previous research, we exclude acquisitions meeting any of the following criteria: (1) the ratio 
of the deal size to market value of the acquirer’s assets is less than 1 percent; (2) the acquiring firm 
controlled more than 50 percent of the target prior to the announcement date or less than 100 percent after 
the acquisition was completed; (3) the ultimate parent of the acquirer and the target are the same (i.e., 
consolidations within holding companies); (4) either the acquirer or the target is a financial firm; or (5) 
the deal was not completed within 1,000 days of the announcement date. 
To test for a change in total acquisition activity after a liability shock, we run the following 
industry-panel regression: 
 0 1( +1) ,jt jt j t jtLn deals b b Exposure e       (2) 
where Ln(deals+1), is the natural log of one plus the total number of deals completed in year t by firms 
whose primary line of business is industry j.  We find similar results if we use the aggregate dollar 
volume of completed deals rather than the total number.  Exposure is defined as in equation (1).  Industry-
level fixed effects, j , control for base differences in the level of acquisitions across industries, and year 
fixed effects, t , control for any secular time trends and changes in the macroeconomy.  As in the 
analysis reported above, we limit the sample to Fama-French industries that experience an exposure 
during the sample period.  This restriction increases the comparability of exposed and unexposed 
industries in the sample, but it does not qualitatively affect the results.  The standard errors are clustered 
at the industry level. 
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We find that industries in which workers were exposed to the newly identified carcinogens 
undertake more acquisitions after the chemical is listed in the RoC.  These results are reported in Table 
VII.  Exposed industries complete about 6.6 percent more deals on average, relative to industries without 
an exposure.  Because the specification includes both industry and year fixed effects, the positive 
coefficient for 1b indicates the increase in the overall number acquisitions following the liability shock, 
relative to both the typical number of completed deals in these industries prior to the shock and the 
concomitant growth in acquisition activity in unaffected industries.   
The increase in acquisitions appears to account for a significant proportion of the growth in 
overall assets reported in Table III.  The average aggregate value of acquisitions undertaken by firms with 
exposures in the ten years after a carcinogen is newly identified is $643 million greater than that of 
unexposed firms, whereas the average aggregate increase in overall assets is $1,358 million greater.  The 
ratio of these two values suggests that at least 47 percent of the asset growth observed in Table III is 
attributable to acquisitions.  The overall contribution of acquisitions toward growth may be greater 
because the subsequent growth of an acquired firm is not captured by this estimate. 
To examine whether these acquisitions are consolidating or diversifying in nature, we classify 
acquisitions based on the SIC codes of the acquirer and target firms.  In addition to a firm’s primary line 
of business, SDC lists up to nine other 4-digit SIC codes which represent “any small side lines the 
company is involved in” (Thomson Financial 1999).  Using this information, we classify an acquisition 
into three distinct types: (1) “main line” if the primary SIC industry for the acquiring firm coincides with 
any SIC code of the target; (2) “side line” if an SIC code listed as a side line business for the acquirer 
matches any SIC code listed for the target, but the acquirer’s primary SIC code does not match; and (3) 
“no match” if none of the target or acquirer’s primary or side lines of business coincide.  We then 
calculate the number of acquisitions at the industry-year-type level and re-estimate equation (2) for each 
type of acquisition.  The results are reported in columns (ii)-(iv) of Table VII. 
The results suggest that the exposed firms are both expanding existing side lines of business and 
expanding into completely new lines of business.  As reported in column (iii), there is a statistically 
significant increase in side line acquisitions after a liability shock, consistent with firms using acquisitions 
to expand side lines of business.  At the same time, there is also a 5.5 percent increase in acquisitions for 
which there is no apparent overlap between the target and acquirer’s businesses, again measured relative 
to industries that do not have such exposures [column (iv)].   
How does the increase in firm risk affect the type of firms being acquired – other than the 
increase in diversification?  To shed some light on this question, we examine the subsample of 
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acquisitions for which financial data are available in Compustat for the target firm.15  We examine 
characteristics of the target firms based on their most recent financial data available in Compustat before 
the acquisition announcement using the following regression: 
 0 1 ,ijt jt j t ijty B B Exposure         (3) 
where y is an ex-ante characteristic of target firm i, in industry j, for an acquisition announced in year t.  
We examine the following target characteristics as dependent variables:  log total assets, five-year 
compounded annual growth rate for assets, the ratio of debt to assets, the ratio of cash flow to assets, and 
the ratio of the total payout to assets.16  Exposure is defined as in equation (1).  We include both industry 
and year fixed effects, and we cluster the standard errors at the industry level.   
Liability exposure seems to affect the type of firms being acquired.  In particular, the evidence 
suggests that the acquired firms are larger, have greater historical growth rates, and have less debt.  The 
results are reported in Panel A of Table VIII.  In terms of total assets, targets acquired by exposed firms 
are 39 percent larger, on average, than targets acquired by unexposed firms [column (i)].  Their growth 
rate in the five years before being acquired is 10.1 percentage points greater on average than for targets 
acquired by unexposed firms [column (ii)].  The targets in these deals also average 6.3 percentage points 
lower ratios of debt to total assets [column (iii)], which may indicate lower takeover gains for the acquirer 
(Israel 1991). 
Exposed firms also tend to acquire targets that generate and pay out greater cash flows per dollar 
of total assets.  Compared with targets acquired by unexposed firms, targets acquired by exposed firms 
average 8.3 percentage points greater ratios of operating cash flows to assets [column (iv)], and 3.4 
percentage points greater ratios of total payouts to assets [column (v)].  These findings suggest that 
exposed firms may be seeking to acquire so called cash cows after experiencing the liability shock.  These 
results may also explain some or all of the increase in the average ratio of total payout to assets for firms 
that grow following a liability shock.  Rather than these firms necessarily increasing the payout ratio from 
their existing lines of business, it is possible that much of the increased payout is coming from the newly 
acquired high-cash-flow business units. 
Exposed firms also pay more, on average, to complete these acquisitions and are more likely to 
                                                            
15 We match the firms in SDC Platinum to Compustat using their CUSIPs.  Unfortunately, historical CUSIPs are not 
available in Compustat, so we determine a firm’s historical CUSIP by matching observations to CRSP using the 
CRSP/Compustat Merged Database, and then using the historical CUSIP reported by CRSP.  When the historical 
CUSIP is missing, we use the CUSIP recorded in Compustat’s header file.   
16 Except for the regression of log total assets, the regressions are estimated by weighted least squares, using the 
target firms’ total assets as weights.  Given the magnitude of the size differences between deals, weighting gives the 
estimates a more meaningful interpretation: the estimated coefficients represent the effect of liability exposure on 
characteristics associated with the average dollar of transaction value (rather than the average deal).  For example, 
the regression of the ratio of cash flows to assets examines whether the ratio of the total cash flows across all 
acquired targets to the total assets acquired increases after the liability shock.  
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finance the deals with stock.  We calculate the takeover premium paid over the target firm’s market value 
in each acquisition and estimate how it changes after liability exposure using equation (3).  The results are 
reported in Panel B of Table VIII.  We find that these acquisitions are associated with nearly 14 
percentage point greater takeover premiums, on average, than the premiums paid on acquisitions by 
unexposed firms [column (vi)].  The share of financing using stock increases by 8 percentage points 
[column (vii)].  In sum, the liability exposure seems to lead firms to pay relatively high prices to 
undertake diversifying, stock-financed acquisitions of large, high-cash-flow-generating firms. 
Investors also appear to perceive the announcements of these mergers as bad news for the firms’ 
shareholders.   Of the acquisitions analyzed in Table VIII, the average abnormal return over a three-day 
window (−1, +1) for acquisitions by exposed firms is −1.35 percent (standard error is 0.31).17  Further 
analysis suggests that the negative abnormal return is attributable to the liability shock, rather than an 
industry or year characteristic.  We estimate the effect of liability exposure on abnormal returns using 
equation (3).  The estimate, reported in column (viii), suggests that acquisitions undertaken by exposed 
firms are associated with abnormal returns that are 1.3 percentage points lower.  This decline in returns 
also holds after controlling for how the acquisitions are financed.   
5. Interpretation  
5.1 Possible explanations 
The dominant finding of our analysis is that firms tend to grow and diversify in response to the 
liability shock, which represents an increased risk of a future, large, adverse shock (see Section 2).  The 
growth is funded primarily with equity and appears largely driven by an increase in diversifying 
acquisitions of large cash cows.  Two leading explanations for why firms respond in this way are costs of 
financial distress and a managerial agency conflict. 
Costly financial distress 
If financial distress is costly, then reducing the likelihood that an adverse shock will cause 
financial distress can create value for shareholders (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1993; Fluck and Lynch 
1999).  One potentially important cost of financial distress may be the loss of organizational capital.  
Organizational capital is productive capacity that derives from knowledge embedded in a firm’s 
organization and its “people relationships” (Prescott and Visscher 1980; Tomer 1987).  Because a firm’s 
organizational capital is vested in the relationships among its workers, much of it may be lost if the firm 
undergoes significant downsizing in response to a large, adverse shock.  To preserve shareholder value, it 
                                                            
17 To estimate abnormal returns, we use standard event study methods (see MacKinlay 1997) and compute market 
model abnormal returns using CRSP equally weighted index returns.  The parameters for the market model are 
estimated over the (−300, −46) day interval.  The results are not sensitive to estimating the parameters for the market 
model over other conventional periods or to defining abnormal returns using net-of-market returns or using the 
value-weighted CRSP market return in the estimation of the market model.   
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may be optimal for a firm to maintain its size by redirecting its operations to a new industry after the 
liability shock (Maksimovic and Phillips 2002).   
This hypothesis matches many of our results.  Increasing growth by undertaking diversifying 
acquisitions could be an optimal response that allows the company to maintain the ability to finance 
profitable investments and preserve organizational capital should large liability costs eventually 
materialize.  Growth provides the firms with deeper pockets from which to pay future liability costs and 
may thereby provide insurance against negative future cash flow shocks affecting the firms' primary 
business.  In further support of a costly financial distress explanation, the growth is also stronger among 
firms for which external finance would be more costly and is funded using equity rather than debt.  The 
desire to avoid incurring these costs is also consistent with our finding that acquisitions shift towards 
firms with high cash flow, which may help the firm avoid future financial distress.18   
There are a number of reasons to believe, however, that this growth may not improve shareholder 
value.  First, the nature of the liability shock suggests that such growth is unlikely to create value for 
shareholders.  Because acquired firms are considered assets of the parent company after a takeover, legal 
liability extends to the target firm.  (As a lawyer aptly put it to us, “If you are being sued by someone you 
hit with your car and then you win the lottery, it is the victim’s lucky day, not yours.”)  If the potential 
damage payments are high enough, then extending the legal liability reduces the value of the target’s 
assets.  Second, the increased acquisitions are associated with negative announcement returns, suggesting 
that some of the growth may not be in shareholders’ interests. 
Managerial agency conflict 
Because distress can be personally costly for managers, the growth may also be driven by 
managers trying to reduce the likelihood of financial distress (even if it was not in shareholders’ interest).  
Negative corporate outcomes often adversely affect a manager’s career prospects, even if poor corporate 
performance is caused by factors beyond their control (Gilson 1989; Jenter and Kanaan 2008).  
Consequently, managers may prioritize the value of their own human capital and the firm’s long-run 
survival above shareholder value and take actions that will reduce the increased risk of a large, adverse 
shock.  For example, managers may alter corporate investment (Holmström 1999) or diversify into new 
lines of business (Amihud and Lev 1981). 
In the presence of these managerial agency conflicts, the increases in growth we observe after the 
liability shock may actually reduce shareholder value and provide an explanation for the negative 
                                                            
18 As a further test of the organizational capital explanation, we also classified firms as having high or low 
organizational capital using their accumulation of SG&A (Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 2008). However, we find no 
difference in how these sets of firms respond to the liability shock (see Appendix Table A-V).  We also find no 
evidence that the effect is larger for firms with a larger market share – another proposed proxy for organizational 
capital (Lev and Radhakrishnan 2004; see Appendix Table A-VI). 
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abnormal returns associated with the increased acquisitions.  The agency model of managerial behavior is 
also consistent with all of the corporate responses to the liability shock documented above.  Managers’ 
interest in insuring their career and personal wealth against a negative shock can explain why firms grow 
through acquisitions and why the growth is concentrated among firms with weak balance sheets, funded 
using equity, and targeted at cash cows holding less leverage and purchased at a premium.  
Diversification, lower leverage, and the acquisition of cash cows increase the likelihood that the firm (and 
the CEO’s job) survives a potential future barrage of liability costs.19   
5.2 Empirical evidence 
To further explore the plausibility of these possible interpretations, we first examine the relation 
between the growth of liability-exposed firms, their corporate governance, and their ownership structures.  
Under both models, firms grow and diversify after the shock to reduce the firms’ exposure to the 
increased risk of future liability costs, but the agency problems are likely to be particularly severe for 
entrenched managers (Jensen and Ruback 1983; Shleifer and Vishny 1989) and for risk-averse managers 
who have much of their wealth tied to the value of the firm’s assets (Holmström 1999; Parrino, 
Poteshman, and Weisbach 2005; Hugonnier and Morellec 2007).  Although high managerial ownership 
may help reduce other agency conflicts by inducing a manager to work hard, it exacerbates the agency 
problem that we focus on, by giving the manager a greater incentive to reduce the firm’s risk. Differences 
in the degree to which managers are monitored by large, institutional shareholders provide a third test of 
whether the diversifying growth is in shareholders’ interest.  Institutions are more likely than individuals 
to hold substantial blocks of shares and thereby to have a financial incentive to monitor management 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1986).  If the increase in growth results from an agency conflict, then we might 
expect to find the growth concentrated among firms with few institutional shareholders. 
To analyze the importance of governance and ownership for how firms respond to an increased 
risk of a large, adverse shock, we return to our original Compustat sample and estimate equation (1) 
separately for firms with different corporate governance, different shares of managerial ownership, and 
different shares of institutional ownership before the shock.  In all cases, we classify firms based on their 
governance and ownership in the year prior to the chemicals’ listings in the RoC.   
To sort firms based on external governance, we use the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (GIM) 
governance index and compare the responses of firms with “weak” corporate governance, as measured by 
a GIM-index greater than or equal to 11, and firms with “strong” governance, as measured by an GIM-
                                                            
19 To increase its likelihood of survival, a firm could also self-insure by issuing equity and retaining the proceeds as 
cash.  Our evidence suggests that this is not a common response to the liability shock.  One potential explanation is 
that accumulating cash would arouse suspicion from investors and is linked empirically to proxy fights and 
executive turnover (Faleye 2004).   
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index less than or equal to 5.20  Because the GIM-index is available only from 1990, we use firms’ 
corporate governance in 1990 as a proxy for their governance in 1988, the year before the 1989 RoC 
report, to increase the number of carcinogenic discoveries that contribute to identification.21 Our analysis 
here is limited to the 18 percent of firms for which we observe the GIM-index; these firms are relatively 
large, accounting for 43 percent of total assets in the full sample.   
To sort firms based on inside ownership, we use the reported shares held by a firm’s senior 
management as a fraction of the firm’s total shares outstanding, as recorded by TFN Insider Filing Data.22  
We compare the responses of firms with high inside ownership, as measured by senior managerial stock 
ownership in the top quartile, and firms with low inside ownership, as measured by senior managerial 
stock ownership in the bottom quartile.  Although the ownership data are available beginning in 1986, 
there are very few observations before 1996, limiting our sample to only 23 percent of firms in our full 
sample, corresponding to 39 percent of total assets. 
To sort firms based on institutional ownership, we use the fraction of a firm’s equity that is 
owned by institutional investors, based on 13(f) filings recorded in the TFN Institutional Holdings 
database.  A 1978 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 requires all institutions with 
more than 100 million dollars of securities under discretionary management to report their holdings to the 
SEC through 13(f) filings.  We compare the responses of firms with limited institutional monitoring, as 
measured by institutional ownership in the bottom quartile, and firms with high institutional monitoring, 
as measured by institutional ownership in the top quartile.  
Estimates of how firms’ growth response varies based on governance and ownership structures 
are reported in Table IX.  We find that the growth is concentrated among firms with weak corporate 
governance, high inside ownership, and low institutional ownership.  As seen in column (i) of Table IX, 
firms with weak governance increase their average size dramatically following the increase in legal 
liability, relative to other weakly governed firms.  Average total assets increase by about 34 percent, 
whereas strong governance firms do not grow on average after the liability shock, and they may even 
shrink. We also find evidence of a sharp increase in growth among firms with high inside ownership or 
                                                            
20 Our results are robust to using alternative cutoffs, including limiting the weak governance sample to firms with a 
GIM index  14 (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003).  Our results are also similar if we divide our sample based on 
the entrenchment index constructed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (forthcoming). 
21 We do not backfill governance any earlier than 1989 because governance in 1990 is likely to be less correlated 
with governance in even earlier years.  
22 Although we would ideally measure the value of the insiders’ shares relative to their personal total wealth, this 
information is not available and their share of firm ownership is a useful proxy.  The share of ownership is 
calculated using the filings derived from Forms 3, 4, and 5 over the period 1986-2005.  These filings originate from 
trades by firm insiders that must be reported to the SEC.  The measure of managerial ownership reflects the average 
total holdings of the CEO, CFO, CIO, and COO in the year, adjusted for stock splits.  We are grateful to Dimitris 
Papanikolaou for providing us with these data as well as the data on institutional ownership (discussed below).  
More details on the construction of both data sets are described in Panousi and Papanikolaou (2008). 
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low institutional ownership [columns (ii)-(iii)] whereas exposed firms with low inside ownership or high 
institutional ownership exhibit a much smaller, non-significant increase.  
These governance and ownership results, combined with the negative returns after acquisition 
announcements, suggest that the growth of liability-exposed firms may be driven by managerial 
incentives rather than shareholders’ interests.  In fact, if the growth has negative NPV, then this growth 
may be one concrete example of how shareholder rights can affect corporate performance and firm value 
(as suggested by the correlations presented by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and others). 
If the diversifying growth we observe is indeed driven by managerial private interests, then the 
growth should benefit managers.  One way managers may benefit from the growth is if it provides them 
with greater job security.  We examine this hypothesis in our setting by analyzing whether rapid growth 
following the liability shock is indeed associated with lower CEO separation rates and a reduced 
likelihood of firms exiting Compustat.23   Specifically, we construct an indicator, Firm exit, which equals 
one if a firm is no longer covered in Compustat five years after the liability shock, and an indicator, CEO 
exit, which equals one if a firm is still covered in Compustat five years after the shock but the CEO has 
changed.  We determine whether a CEO exit has occurred using data on CEO tenure and age provided in 
the Disclosure database used by Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008).24  Using firms’ asset growth from the 
year before to the year after the liability shock, we restrict our sample to exposed firms that were either in 
the top or bottom quartiles of growth and regress the two exit measures onto an indicator for being in the 
top quartile of growth.  The estimates are reported in Table X.   
Exposed firms that grow significantly after the liability shock are much less likely to exit 
Compustat or replace their CEO.  Exposed firms in the top quartile of growth were nearly 15 percentage 
points less likely to exit Compustat within five years after the shock relative to exposed firms in the 
bottom quartile of growth [Table X, Column (i)].  Among firms still covered by Compustat five years 
after the liability shock, the average CEO exit rate was also 6.8 percentage points lower [Column (ii)].  
Combining the two exit measures, exposed firms with significant post-liability shock growth have an 
average rate of CEO or firm exit that is 16 percentage points lower [Column (iii)].   
Finally, we analyze whether governance and ownership structures are related to the observed 
increases in payouts shown in Table IV.  If shareholders’ costs of financial distress are not too high, then 
such an increase in payouts might benefit shareholders.  To the extent that the liability shock decreases 
                                                            
23 While there are a number of possible reasons why a firm may exit Compustat, most of them, such as bankruptcy 
or takeover, are often associated with managerial turnover. 
24 We greatly thank James S. Linck for providing us the data on CEO age and tenure.  Using the CEO tenure 
information available in this data, we are able to construct a measure of when a CEO exit occurs.  Because CEO 
tenure is not available for many firms, we also use changes in CEO age to determine when a CEO exit occurs.  
Specifically, we consider a firm exit to occur if CEO age declines from the previous year (which would indicate a 
new, younger CEO) or CEO age increases by more than two from the previous year (indicating a new, older CEO).   
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the returns on new investments, increasing payouts would allow investors to redeploy these funds more 
profitably to other firms that are not exposed to the liability.  If the increase in payouts to shareholders 
after the liability shock is concentrated among firms with strong external governance, low inside 
ownership, and large institutional shareholders, then we might conclude that shareholders typically prefer 
that the manager pay out capital than grow the firm.  The estimates for these regressions are reported in 
Table XI. 
While strong governance, low inside ownership, and high institutional ownership firms do not 
grow following the liability shock, they do significantly increase their average total payouts to 
shareholders.  Strong governance firms increase their total payout ratio by 45.9 percent relative to a 
sample mean of 2.54 for strong governance firms before the shock, and the increase is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level [Table XI, Column (i)].  Low inside ownership and high institutional 
ownership firms exhibit similar increases in payouts [Table XI, Columns (ii)-(iii)].  Weak governance 
firms, high inside ownership, and low institutional ownership firms, on the other hand, do not exhibit 
statistically significant increases in their payouts, and the point estimates are smaller.25   
Overall, the corporate governance, managerial ownership, institutional monitoring, and CEO exit 
results show that managerial private interest can play a significant role in corporate responses to an 
adverse shock.  Average growth is large when agency problems are more severe -- when firms have 
weaker external governance, when senior management holds a larger equity stake in the firm, and when 
relatively few equity shares are held by institutional investors.  Firms that grow also exhibit fewer CEO 
turnovers suggesting that managers benefit from this growth.  At the same time, firms where agency 
problems are milder – firms with strong external governance, low inside ownership, and high institutional 
ownership – do not grow; instead, they greatly increase their payouts to shareholders.  These results 
suggest that much of the diversifying growth may not be in shareholders’ interest, and that the average 
shareholder might prefer managers to pay out the excess cash.   
5.3 Alternative interpretations 
Two additional explanations for firms’ financing and investment responses to the liability shock 
also merit careful consideration: asymmetric information and managerial effort. 
                                                            
25 Differences in ex-ante financial vulnerability do not appear to explain these results or the growth results.  The 
average modified z-score for weak governance firms prior to the shock is 1.94, whereas the average modified z-
score for strong governance firms is 2.06.  The difference of 0.12 is only one-tenth of a standard deviation, and the 
p-value of the difference is 0.406.  Firms with higher inside ownership also exhibit a lower average bankruptcy risk 
than firms with low inside ownership.   Only in the case of institutional ownership do we find a possible concern in 
that average bankruptcy risk of firms with low institutional ownership is significantly lower than that of firms with 
high institutional ownership.  However, after double-sorting the data based on bankruptcy risk and institutional 
ownership, we find that greater bankruptcy risk and less monitoring appear to be both independently related to 
firms’ responses to the liability shock.  These estimates are reported in Appendix Table A-VII.   
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Asymmetric information 
If investors do not have as much information about the potential legal liability as the firms’ 
managers, then the managers may be making money for existing shareholders by exploiting this 
asymmetric information to issue overvalued equity – through both secondary equity issues and stock 
acquisitions.  While firms are required by law to warn employees about their exposure to substances that 
are included in the RoC, it is possible that the financial market does not pick up on these risks or 
systematically underestimates the firm’s exposure to them.  Huberman and Regev (2001) lend some 
plausibility to this hypothesis by documenting a case in which the market did not price public scientific 
information (previously published in the journal Nature and various popular newspapers) until it appeared 
in a prominent article in the Sunday New York Times.   
Asymmetric information, however, cannot easily explain all of our results.26  It is unclear why 
information asymmetry would cause a shift towards acquisitions of firms with higher cash flows.  
Furthermore, if investors are unaware of the shock and managers are acting on their own, there is little 
reason to expect the growth to be concentrated among firms with weak external governance or high inside 
ownership.  One possibility is that weak governance is correlated with superior CEO ability (e.g., 
Hermalin and Weisbach 1998), and that higher ability CEOs are more likely to exploit over-valued equity 
using stock acquisitions.  However, even this explanation cannot explain why the growth is also 
concentrated among firms with low institutional ownership.   
Managerial effort 
Agency models of the firm provide another possible explanation for some of our results.  As 
noted by Grossman and Hart (1983), fear of bankruptcy and employment loss can provide particularly 
strong incentives for managers to exert effort.  Because large, future cash outflows pose a threat to a 
manager’s employment, particularly for financially vulnerable firms, it is possible the liability shock 
induces managers to exert greater effort to improve firm value, which may in turn increase the likelihood 
of survival should litigation occur.  Opportunities to improve effort may also be greater among weakly 
governed firms if managers at these firms were exerting less effort before the shock.  It is possible that 
greater managerial effort would manifest itself as higher growth, more aggressive cost cutting, and 
                                                            
26 In an attempt to examine whether the investors seem to be aware of the liability shock, we also looked at how 
firms’ market-to-book ratios change after the shock.  The estimates are small in magnitude and very noisy.  The 
results are consistent with many investors not being aware of the shock, but other explanations are also possible.  
For example, the effects may vary across firms depending on their financial vulnerability: on average, the market-to-
book ratio decreases by 0.15 percentage points after the shock among firms with high bankruptcy risk (standard 
error 0.56) and increases by 0.22 percentage points after the shock among firms with low bankruptcy risk (standard 
error 0.22).  It is possible that the shock harms high bankruptcy risk firms by increasing the expected costs of 
financial distress, thereby benefiting the low bankruptcy risk firms indirectly by improving their competitive 
position in product markets (Bolton and Scharfstein 1990).  In all, these estimates are too noisy to draw a clear 
conclusion either way. 
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improved profitability.  In this scenario, the growth would be driven by managers’ exposure to firm risk 
but would actually be in shareholders' interest.   
There is little evidence, however, that the liability shock affects measures of firm performance 
that might indicate greater managerial effort.  There is no evidence that firms’ return on assets (ROA) or 
asset turnover (sales/assets) improve following the liability shock.  There is also no evidence that wages 
or other costs decline significantly (see Appendix Table A-VIII).  Increased managerial effort also cannot 
explain a number of our other results.  It does not explain why the growth would tend to diversify firms’ 
operations or be targeted at acquiring cash cows. The negative announcements returns associated with 
these acquisitions are also not consistent with this growth being in shareholders’ interest.   
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines how firms respond to exogenous increases in legal liability resulting from 
employees’ exposure to carcinogens.  Like many other business risks, the increase in legal liability 
represents an increased probability of large, adverse shocks in the company’s future.  We find that such 
firms tend to grow aggressively using both capital investment and acquisitions, and this growth is 
concentrated among firms that are more financially vulnerable to the realization of an adverse shock and 
funded primarily with equity.  The acquisitions appear to diversify firms’ assets and to target large firms 
with relatively high operating cash flows, recent growth, and total payouts.  Relative to acquisitions 
undertaken by similar firms without liability exposure, these acquisitions are associated with higher 
takeover premiums and greater equity financing.   
Firms’ responses to the liability shock seem to be aimed at reducing the firms’ exposure to the 
newfound risks.  These actions can create value for shareholders if they reduce the probability of costly 
financial distress.  Managers likely also benefit personally from reducing the liability risks, which can 
threaten the managers’ private benefits, reputation, and future income even if the risks are caused by 
factors beyond their control (Gilson 1989; Jenter and Kanaan 2008).  Empirically, managers’ personal 
incentives appear to play a role.  The increased growth is associated with less CEO turnover among 
exposed firms, and when growth is announced, it is met with negative abnormal returns.  We also find 
that firms with weak external governance grow by almost 35 percent on average after the liability shock, 
whereas firms with strong external governance do not grow.  Firm growth is also larger both when senior 
management holds larger equity stakes in the firm (magnifying their sensitivity to firm risk) and when 
relatively few equity shares are held by institutional investors (who are thought to monitor managers).  
Instead of growing, firms likely to have few agency conflicts increase total payouts to shareholders, 
suggesting that shareholders of the average liability-exposed firm might prefer that managers pay out the 
excess cash rather than grow the firm.   
Other examples of corporate responses to liability risk may be found in the growth of tobacco 
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firms in the 1960s and ’80s.  The U.S. Surgeon General (1964) released its first report on the health 
consequences of smoking in 1964.  Almost immediately, major American cigarette companies began 
expanding into nontobacco businesses, such as consumer packaged goods, dog food, whisky, corn-oil 
refining, and domestic crude oil and natural gas exploration.  The industry experienced another round of 
diversification two decades later.  The first academic medical study documenting the harmful effects of 
second-hand smoke was published in 1981 (Hirayama 1981), opening cigarettes to new regulation.  
Within a few years, R.J. Reynolds bought Nabisco and Philip Morris bought General Foods and 
eventually Kraft.  Jensen (1986) points to these diversification programs as prominent examples of 
managers making investments that are contrary to shareholders’ interests. 
Our results have broad implications beyond the effects of legal liability.  The liability shocks we 
study have characteristics similar to many other business risks that firms face in that they reduce firms’ 
expected future cash flows and the expected returns on investments but have a limited effect on current 
cash flows.  Roughly speaking, these characteristics are similar to a shock, such as a technological 
innovation, that increases the probability of future competitive entry into a firm’s product market.  If entry 
eventually occurs, the firm’s cash flows will be reduced; this is similar to the reduction in cash flow that 
is likely to be realized when liability damages are eventually incurred.  Additional parallels can be drawn 
to any number of other business risks that involve a decrease in expected future cash flows — for 
example, the risk that tariffs will be eliminated or that new regulations will greatly increase a firm’s 
marginal costs of production.  Case studies of declining industries also document corporate behavior 
similar to that in our findings.  Examples include the steel industry in the late 1970s (Hall 1997), the oil 
industry in the 1980s (Jensen 1986), and the defense industry after the cold war (Dial and Murphy 1995).  
While we cannot be sure how managers might respond to other particular shocks, the results 
presented here suggest that the responses may not always coincide with shareholders’ interests.  To the 
extent that managerial agency conflicts play a role, our evidence offers insight into managerial 
preferences.  Based on corporate responses to antitakeover legislation, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) 
conclude that the average manager does not have a preference for empire building or diversification.  
Although the average manager may be “reluctant to undertake cognitively difficult activities” (what 
Bertrand and Mullainathan also call the “quiet life”; p. 1067), our results suggest that many managers are 
willing to overcome this reluctance when the stakes are sufficiently high.  Our finding that the intensive 
growth following an adverse shock is concentrated among financially vulnerable firms also suggests that 
managers’ motivations for growing their firms may be more accurately characterized by “career 
concerns” than by a preference for empire-building per se.  Putting these results together suggests that 
agency problems can play out quite differently in normal times than when times are tough.   
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An interaction between managerial agency conflicts and corporate financial vulnerability also has 
implications for a firm’s optimal capital structure.  Jensen (1986) describes the scope for using debt to 
reduce managerial agency problems at “firms that have stable business histories and substantial free cash 
flow” (p. 325).  Our evidence reinforces the importance of Jensen’s first condition, that the business be 
stable.  If managers’ objectives and shareholder interests can diverge as a firm approaches financial 
distress, then a high amount of financial leverage that moderates managerial agency problems in normal 
times may amplify another managerial agency conflict when the firm encounters an adverse shock.  This 
potential cost of debt financing – and a broader interaction between agency conflicts with financial 
distress – has received little attention in the literature and presents an interesting area for future research. 
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Figure 1‐‐ Number of firms affected by liability shock by year
This figure graphs the number of firms newly affected by the liability shock by year. A firm is
considered affected if at least 7.5 percent of employees in its industry were observed in the
National Occupational Exposure Survey to be exposed to a chemical listed in the Report on
Carcinogens in that year. A total of 2,209 firms are affected.
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Figure 2 ‐‐ Effect of liability shock on growth by year
This figure reports the point estimates from a firm‐panel regression of ln(assets) onto an
indicator for liability exposure, firm‐by‐cohort fixed effects, and year‐by‐cohort fixed effects.
The specification is the same as that reported in Table III except that the effect of liability
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exposure is allowed to vary by year for each year from five years before the shock through
ten years after. Ninety‐five percent confidence intervals, adjusted for clustering at the
industry level, are also plotted.
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Figure 3 – Effect of liability shock on growth by the fraction of employees exposed 
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This figure plots estimates from a firm‐panel semi‐parametric regression of ln(assets) on the
percent of employees exposed, firm‐by‐cohort fixed effects, and year‐by‐cohort fixed
effects. The specification is the same as that reported in Table III except that the effect of
liability exposure is allowed to vary non‐parametrically with the fraction of employees exposed
using a Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth of 0.01. Ninety‐five percent confidence intervals,
estimated using bootstrapping, are also plotted.
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Exposed Unexposed
p‐value of 
difference
(i) (ii) (iii)
Ln(Assets) 4.586 4.256 0.261
(2.607) (2.360)
Market‐to‐book ratio 3.036 3.095 0.929
(5.614) (6.081)
5‐year asset CAGR (%) 13.83 13.16 0.622
(20.61) (20.22)
Firm age 13.77 12.78 0.453
11.32 11.43
Leverage 0.285 0.285 0.983
(0.252) (0.269)
Total payout / Assets * 100 1.856 1.813 0.830
(3.525) (3.643)
Capex / Assets 0.086 0.081 0.228
(0.076) (0.085)
Cash / Assets 0.093 0.094 0.981
(0.148) (0.151)
Observations 2,209 8,373
# of Industries 106 249
Table I
Ex‐ante firm characteristics
This table reports summary statistics for firm characteristics in the year before a new chemical
was added to the Report on Carcinogens. The mean and standard deviation (in parentheses)
for each variable are reported separately for two samples of firms. Column (i) reports
estimates for firms in 4‐digit SIC industries for which more than 7.5% of employees were
observed to be exposed to the chemical in the 1981‐1983 National Occupational Exposure
Survey. Column (ii) reports estimates for other firms in the same Fama‐French 48 industry
classification. Column (iii) reports the p‐value from a t‐test for the difference between exposed
and unexposed firms, where the standard errors are clustered at the 4‐digit SIC industry level.
Firm age is the number of years since the firm's first information in Compustat. The sample is
restricted to firms with nonmissing observations for ln(assets), ln(sales), ln(capital
expenditures+1), equity, ln(debt+1), and ln(dividends+1). 
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Year relative to 
liability shock Exposed Unexposed
p‐value of 
difference
(i) (ii) (iii)
t = ‐1 0.048 0.048 0.981
(0.258) (0.255)
t = 0 0.042 0.025 0.530
(0.273) (0.293)
t = 1 0.049 0.037 0.649
(0.273) (0.287)
Table II
Cash flows around time of liability shock
This table reports summary statistics for cash flows/assets in the years around a
new chemical being added to the Report on Carcinogens. The mean and
standard deviation (in parentheses) for cash flows in the years t = ‐1, t = 0, and t
= 1, are reported separately for two samples of firms. Column (i) reports
estimates for firms in 4‐digit SIC industries for which more than 7.5% of
employees were observed to be exposed to the chemical in the 1981‐1983
National Occupational Exposure Survey. Column (ii) reports estimates for other
firms in the same Fama‐French 48 industry classification. Column (iii) reports
the p‐value from a t‐test for the difference between exposed and unexposed
firms, where the standard errors are clustered at the 4‐digit SIC industry level.
The sample is restricted to firms with nonmissing observations for ln(assets),
ln(sales), ln(capital expenditures+1), equity, ln(debt+1), and ln(dividends+1). 
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Dep. Variable = Ln(Assets) Ln(Sales) Ln(Capex + 1)
(i) (ii) (iii)
Exposure 0.098* 0.105** 0.055
(0.056) (0.049) (0.045)
Observations 144,650 144,650 144,650
# of Firms 10,582 10,582 10,582
R‐Squared 0.32 0.27 0.14
Fixed effects:
   Firm‐cohort X X X
   Year‐cohort X X X
Table III
Effect of liability exposure on firm size and investment
This table reports coefficients from firm‐panel regressions of firm size and
investment on an indicator for liability exposure, firm‐by‐cohort fixed effects, and
year‐by‐cohort fixed effects. The liability exposure indicator equals 1 if more
than 7.5% of employees in the firm’s 4‐digit SIC industry were observed to be
exposed in the 1981‐1983 National Occupational Exposure Survey to a chemical
listed in the most recent edition of the Report on Carcinogens (RoC). The
dependent variables are ln(assets), ln(sales), and ln(capex + 1). The data include
firm‐year observations in the 10 years before and 10 years after each new
chemical listing in the RoC. Standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are
reported in parentheses.  * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level.
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Dep. Variable =  s Ln(Equity + 1) Ln(Debt + 1) Debt / 
Assets
Total payout / 
Assets * 100
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Exposure 0.100** 0.0352 ‐0.017* 0.301***
(0.050) 0.045 (0.010) (0.104)
Observations 137,539 144,650 144,650 144,650
# of Firms 10,539 10,582 10,582 10,582
R‐Squared 0.26 0.14 0.02 0.01
Fixed effects:
   Firm‐cohort X X X X
   Year‐cohort X X X X
Table IV
Effect of liability exposure on corporate financing decisions
This table reports coefficients from firm‐panel regressions of firm financial choices regarding debt, equity,
and payout policy on an indicator for liability exposure, firm‐by‐cohort fixed effects, and year‐by‐cohort
fixed effects. The specifications are the same as those reported in Table III, but for different dependent
variables: ln(equity + 1), ln(debt + 1), debt / assets, and total payout / assets * 100, where total payout is
the sum of dividends and share repurchases. Standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported
in parentheses.  * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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Dep. Variable = Ln(Assets) Ln(Sales) Ln(Capex+1)
(i) (ii) (iii)
Exposure 0.321*** 0.390*** 0.118**
(0.073) (0.086) (0.058)
R‐Squared 0.12 0.13 0.07
Exposure 0.029 0.010 0.029
(0.088) (0.061) (0.063)
R‐Squared 0.51 0.45 0.27
Fixed effects:
   Firm‐cohort X X X
   Year‐cohort X X X
[2,561 firms; 37,984 observations]
Table V
Bankruptcy risk and the effects of liability exposure
This table reports coefficients from firm‐panel regressions of firm size and investment
on an indicator for liability exposure, firm‐by‐cohort fixed effects, and year‐by‐cohort
fixed effects. The specifications are the same as those reported in Table III, but Panel A
restricts the sample to only firms with modified Altman z‐scores in the bottom quartile
while Panel B restricts the sample to only firms with modified Altman z‐scores in the
top quartile. The dependent variables are ln(assets), ln(sales), and ln(capex + 1).
Standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. *
significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
A. High bankruptcy risk: z‐score in bottom quartile at t = −1 
[2,561 firms; 29,311 observations]
        B. Low bankruptcy risk: z‐score in top quartile at t  = −1
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
High 
leverage
Low 
cash flow
Zero 
dividends
Small 
firms
Exposure 0.198*** 0.173** 0.184** 0.211***
(0.075) (0.073) (0.072) (0.076)
Observations 34,431 27,193 78,840 29,489
# of Firms 2,648 2,303 6,636 2,648
R‐Squared 0.23 0.17 0.23 0.14
Low 
leverage
High 
cash flow
Positive 
dividends
Large 
firms
Exposure 0.068 0.043 0.010 0.089
(0.085) (0.102) (0.053) (0.069)
Observations 34,074 35,285 65811 43,863
# of Firms 2,648 2,303 3946 2,648
R‐Squared 0.36 0.44 0.55 0.49
Fixed effects:
   Firm‐cohort X X X X
   Year‐cohort X X X X
Table VI
Financial vulnerability and the effects of liability exposure
This table reports coefficients from firm‐panel regressions of Ln(Assets) on an indicator for
liability exposure, firm‐by‐cohort fixed effects, and year‐by‐cohort fixed effects. The
specifications are the same as those reported in Table III, but estimates are obtained for
different subsamples of firms: firms with debt / assets in the top and bottom quartiles [column
(i)], firms with operating cash flows / assets in the top and bottom quartiles [column (ii)], firms
with zero or positive dividends [column (iii)], and firms with assets in the bottom and top
quartiles [column (iv)]. Standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in
parentheses.  * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
        Dependent Variable  = Ln(Assets)
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    Dependent Variable  = Ln(Number of Acquisitions + 1)
    [842 Industries; 22,734 Observations]
All Main line Side line No           
Match
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Exposure 0.064* 0.037 0.035* 0.054**
(0.034) (0.031) (0.020) (0.025)
R‐Squared 0.22 0.15 0.07 0.14
Fixed effects:
   Industry X X X X
   Year X X X X
Table VII
Effect of liability exposure on acquisition activity
This table reports coefficients from industry‐panel regressions of ln(acquisitions+1) on an
indicator for liability exposure, industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The liability
exposure indicator equals 1 if more than 7.5% of employees in the firm’s 4‐digit SIC
industry were observed to be exposed in the 1981‐1983 National Occupational Exposure
Survey to a chemical listed in the most recent edition of the Report on Carcinogens (RoC). 
We further classify acquisitions into three types: "main line” if the primary SIC industry
for the acquiring firm coincides with any SIC code of the target; “side line” if the
acquirer’s primary SIC code does not match any SIC code listed for the target, but an SIC
code listed as a side line business does; and “no match” if none of the target or acquirer’s
primary or side lines of business coincide. The sample includes all acquisitions
announced between 1980 and 2006 that were recorded in SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions
Database, but excludes acquisitions meeting any of the following criteria: (1) the ratio of
the deal size to market value of the acquirer’s assets is less than 1%; (2) the acquiring firm
controlled more than 50% of the target prior to the announcement date or less than 100%
after the acquisition was completed; (3) the ultimate parent of the acquirer and the target
are the same (i.e., consolidations within holding companies); (4) either the acquirer or the
target is a financial firm; or (5) the deal was not completed within 1,000 days of the
announcement date. We also exclude Fama‐French (1997) industries where none of the
included 4‐digit SIC codes experience an exposure during the sample period. Standard
errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%
level, ** significant at 5% level.
Type of Acquistions
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Dep. Variable = Ln(Assets) 5‐year Assets 
CAGR
Debt / 
Assets
Cash flow / 
Assets
Payout / 
Assets * 100
Takeover 
premium
Percent 
Stock
Acquirer 
CAR [‐1,1]
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Exposure 0.331* 0.101** ‐0.063*** 0.083*** 3.425*** 0.137** 8.034* ‐0.013*
(0.178) (0.045) (0.020) (0.030) (1.307) (0.067) (4.389) (0.008)
R‐Squared 0.38 0.38 0.48 0.44 0.50 0.07 0.41 0.21
Fixed effects:
   Industry X X X X X X X X
   Year X X X X X X X X
Table VIII
Effect of liability exposure on the characteristics of acquisitions
This table reports coefficients from firm‐panel regressions of acquisition and ex‐ante target firm characteristics on an indicator for liability
exposure, industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The liability exposure indicator equals 1 if more than 7.5% of employees in the firm’s 4‐
digit SIC industry were observed exposed in the 1981‐1983 National Occupational Exposure Survey to a chemical listed in the most recent edition
of the Report on Carcinogens (RoC). In Panel A, the dependent variables are ex‐ante target characteristics: log total assets, 5‐year compounded
annual growth rate (CAGR) for assets, the ratio of debt to assets, the ratio of cash flow to asset, and the ratio of the total payout to assets. In
Panel B, the dependent variables are other characteristics of the acquisition: takeover premium, percent of stock used, and acquirer cumulative
abnormal return over a three‐day announcement window (CAR[‐1,1]). The sample of acquisitions is the same as that used in Table VII, but further
restricted to mergers with non‐missing observations for premium, CAR, and log target assets, leaving 2,253 firms. Fewer observations are
available for growth rate (1,526), cash flow (2,164), and percent stock (2,142). Target characteristics are from Compustat, and abnormal returns
are computed using a market model and CRSP equally‐weighted index returns, estimated over the (‐300,‐46) day interval. Estimates for growth
rate, leverage, cash flow, and total payout are weighted by target firm size. Standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in
parentheses. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
A. Target characteristics B. Acquisition characteristics
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(i) (ii) (iii)
Weak 
governance
High inside 
ownership
Low institutional 
ownership
Exposure 0.295*** 0.523** 0.318***
(0.109) (0.258) (0.092)
Observations 5,515 2,131 20,116
# of Firms 311 165 1,618
R‐Squared 0.59 0.49 0.21
Strong 
governance
Low inside 
ownerhip
High institutional 
ownership
Exposure ‐0.037 0.195 0.077
(0.189) (0.128) (0.083)
Observations 2,202 2,248 26,893
# of Firms 165 165 1,618
R‐Squared 0.50 0.50 0.54
Fixed effects:
   Firm‐cohort X X X
   Year‐cohort X X X
Table IX
Governance, ownership, and growth
This table reports coefficients from firm‐panel regressions of Ln(Assets) on an
indicator for liability exposure, firm‐by‐cohort fixed effects, and year‐by‐cohort
fixed effects. The specifications are the same as those reported in Table III, but
estimates are obtained for different subsamples of firms based on firm‐level
characteristics at time t‐1: firms with weak and strong external governence
(GIM >= 11 and GIM <=5 respectively) [column (i)], firms with managerial
ownership in the top and bottom quartiles [column (ii)], and firms with
institutional ownership in the top and bottom quartiles [column (iii)]. Standard
errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. *
significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
        Dependent Variable  = Ln(Assets)
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Dep. Variable =   
(i) (ii) (iii)
High Growth [t‐1,t+1] ‐0.147*** ‐0.069** ‐0.160***
(0.026) (0.030) (0.031)
Observations 912 674 912
R‐Squared 0.04 0.06 0.06
Cohort fixed effects X X X
This table reports coefficients from firm‐level regressions of firm and CEO exit rates on an
indicator for whether a firm was in the top quartile of growth in the years following the
liability shock. Only firms experiencing a liability exposure between 1983 and 2000 that
exhibit growth either in the top or bottom quartile are included in the regression. Liability
exposure is determined as in Table III, and firm's growth response to the liability shock is
measured using the percent change in assets between years t=‐1 and t=1. The dependent
variable, 'firm exit occurs by t=5', is an indicator equal to one if a firm is no longer found
within Compustat five years after the liability shock, and zero otherwise. 'Firm or CEO exit by
t=5' is an indicator equal to one if either a firm exit occurs or the CEO changes in the five
years after the liability shock. 'CEO exit occurs by t=5' is an indicator equal to 1 if a change in
the CEO occurs during the five year period following the liability shock for firms that have not
exited within five years after the shock. All estimates include cohort fixed effects, and
standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at
10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
Table X
Growth and exit rates for exposed firms and their CEOs
Firm exit 
occurs by t=5
CEO or firm exit 
occurs by t=5
CEO exit 
occurs by t=5
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(i) (ii) (iii)
Weak 
governance
High inside 
ownership
Low institutional 
ownership
Exposure 0.690 0.658 0.055
(0.409) (0.527) (0.134)
Observations 5,515 2,131 20,116
# of Firms 311 165 1,618
R‐Squared 0.07 0.05 0.01
Strong 
governance
Low inside 
ownerhip
High institutional 
ownership
Exposure 1.165** 1.797* 0.470*
(0.486) (0.932) (0.266)
Observations 2,202 2,248 26,893
# of Firms 165 165 1,618
R‐Squared 0.04 0.07 0.04
Fixed effects:
   Firm‐cohort X X X
   Year‐cohort X X X
Table XI
Governance, ownership, and payout policy
This table reports coefficients from firm‐panel regressions of total payouts/assets
* 100 on an indicator for liability exposure, firm‐by‐cohort fixed effects, and year‐
by‐cohort fixed effects. The specifications are the same as those reported in
Table III, but estimates are obtained for different subsamples of firms based on
firm‐level characteristics at time t‐1: firms with weak and strong external
governence (GIM >= 11 and GIM <=5 respectively) [column (i)], firms with
managerial ownership in the top and bottom quartiles [column (ii)], and firms
with institutional ownership in the top and bottom quartiles [column (iii)].
Standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. *
significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
        Dependent Variable  = Total payouts / Assets * 100
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This figure reports the point estimates from a firm‐panel regression of ln(assets) on an indicator for
liability exposure, firm‐by‐cohort fixed effects, and year‐by‐cohort fixed effects. The specification
is the same as that reported in Table V except that the effect of liability exposure is allowed to vary
by year for each year from five years before the shock through ten years after. Panel A restricts
the sample to only firms with Altman z‐scores in the bottom quartile while Panel B restricts the
sample to only firms with Altman z‐scores in the top quartile. Ninety‐five percent confidence
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intervals, adjusted for clustering at the industry level, are also plotted.
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Dep. Variable = Ln(Assets) Ln(Sales) Ln(Capex + 1)
(i) (ii) (iii)
Exposure 0.099** 0.097** 0.046
(0.042) (0.040) (0.047)
Cash Flows / Assets [t‐1] 0.346*** 0.503*** 0.260***
(0.051) (0.042) (0.027)
MTB [t‐1] 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 105,710 105,710 105,710
# of Firms 9,673 9,673 9,673
R‐Squared 0.33 0.28 0.15
Fixed effects:
   Firm‐cohort X X X
   Year‐cohort X X X
Appendix Table A‐I
Effect of liability exposure on firm size and investment, 
controlling for cash flows/assets and MTB
This table reports coefficients from firm‐panel regressions of firm size and investment on 
an indicator for liability exposure, firm‐by‐cohort fixed effects, year‐by‐cohort fixed
effects, lagged operating cash flows/assets, and lagged market‐to‐book ratio. The
liability exposure indicator equals 1 if more than 7.5% of employees in the firm’s 4‐digit
SIC industry were observed to be exposed in the 1981‐1983 National Occupational
Exposure Survey to a chemical listed in the most recent edition of the Report on
Carcinogens (RoC). The dependent variables are ln(assets), ln(sales), and ln(capex + 1).
The data include firm‐year observations in the 10 years before and 10 years after each
new chemical listing in the RoC. Standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are
reported in parentheses.  * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level.
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Dep. Variable =  s Ln(Equity + 1) Ln(Debt + 1) Debt / 
Assets
Total payout / 
Assets * 100
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Exposure 0.051 ‐0.003 ‐0.014** 0.275**
(0.033) (0.037) (0.007) (0.107)
Fixed Assets / Assets [t‐1] ‐0.163** 0.859*** 0.182*** ‐1.144***
(0.064) (0.090) (0.016) (0.186)
Ln(Sales) [t‐1] 0.495*** 0.555*** 0.025*** 0.146***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.003) (0.045)
Modified Altman‐Z Score [t‐1] 0.028*** ‐0.030*** ‐0.019*** 0.033***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007)
ROA [t‐1] 0.0441 ‐0.298*** ‐0.075*** 0.455***
(0.066) (0.020) (0.014) (0.095)
Observations 118,157 123,885 123,885 123,885
# of Firms 10,182 10,289 10,289 10,289
R‐Squared 0.44 0.26 0.1 0.02
Fixed effects:
   Firm‐cohort X X X X
   Year‐cohort X X X X
Appendix Table A‐II
Effect of liability exposure on corporate financing decisions, controlling for 
sales, ROA, bankruptcy risk, and proportion of fixed assets
This table reports coefficients from firm‐panel regressions of firm financial choices regarding debt, equity,
and payout policy on an indicator for liability exposure, firm‐by‐cohort fixed effects, year‐by‐cohort fixed
effects, and lagged controls for fixed assets/total assets, Ln(sales), modified Altman‐Z score, and ROA. The
specifications are the same as those reported in Table III, but for different dependent variables: ln(equity +
1), ln(debt + 1), debt / assets, and total payout / assets * 100, where total payout is the sum of dividends
and share repurchases. Standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. *
significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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Dep. Variable = Ln(Assets) Ln(Sales) Ln(Capex+1)
(i) (ii) (iii)
Exposure 0.355*** 0.311** 0.078
(0.106) (0.127) (0.065)
R‐Squared 0.12 0.10 0.05
Exposure ‐0.026 0.002 0.054
(0.087) (0.085) (0.087)
R‐Squared 0.56 0.51 0.31
Fixed effects:
   Firm‐cohort X X X
   Year‐cohort X X X
[1,037 firms; 16,019 observations]
Appendix Table A‐III
Bankruptcy risk and growth, Pre‐1989
This table reports coefficients from firm‐panel regressions of firm size and investment
on an indicator for liability exposure, firm‐by‐cohort fixed effects, and year‐by‐cohort
fixed effects. The specifications are the same as those reported in Table V, except
that only liability shocks that occur prior to 1989 are included. The dependent
variables are ln(assets), ln(sales), and ln(capex + 1). Standard errors, clustered at the
industry level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at
5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
A. High bankruptcy risk: z‐score in bottom quartile at t = −1 
[1,037 firms; 12,461 observations]
        B. Low bankruptcy risk: z‐score in top quartile at t  = −1
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Dep. Variable Ln(Assets) Ln(Sales) Ln(Capex+1)
(i) (ii) (iii)
Exposure 0.297*** 0.444*** 0.145*
(0.100) (0.119) (0.078)
R‐Squared 0.11 0.15 0.08
Exposure 0.055 0.014 0.017
(0.121) (0.080) (0.084)
R‐Squared 0.48 0.42 0.25
Fixed effects:
   Firm‐cohort X X X
   Year‐cohort X X X
[1,524 firms; 21,965 observations]
Appendix Table A‐IV
Bankruptcy risk and growth, post‐1989
This table reports coefficients from firm‐panel regressions of firm size and
investment on an indicator for liability exposure, firm‐by‐cohort fixed effects, and
year‐by‐cohort fixed effects. The specifications are the same as those reported in
Table V, except that only liability shocks that occur in 1989 or later are included. The
dependent variables are ln(assets), ln(sales), and ln(capex + 1). Standard errors,
clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%
level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
A. High bankruptcy risk: z‐score in bottom quartile at t = −1 
[1,524 firms; 16,850 observations]
        B. Low bankruptcy risk: z‐score in top quartile at t  = −1
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Dep. Variable =  S Ln(Assets) Ln(Sales) Ln(Capex+1)
(i) (ii) (iii)
Exposure 0.088 0.096 0.063
(0.089) (0.080) (0.078)
R‐Squared 0.38 0.34 0.16
Exposure 0.098 0.132* ‐0.004
(0.074) (0.068) (0.047)
R‐Squared 0.20 0.17 0.12
Fixed effects:
   Firm‐cohort X X X
   Year‐cohort X X X
[2,648 firms; 37,775 observations]
[2,702 firms; 36,903 observations]
Appendix Table A‐V
Effects of liability exposure based on stock of SG&A
This table reports coefficients from firm‐panel regressions of firm size and investment on an indicator for
liability exposure, firm‐by‐cohort fixed effects, and year‐by‐cohort fixed effects. The specifications are the
same as those reported in Table III, but Panel A restricts the sample to only firms with an accumulation of
SG&A, calculated using a 20% depreciation rate, in the bottom quartile at time t = ‐1, while Panel B restricts
the sample to only firms with an accumulation of SG&A in the top quartile at time t = ‐1. See Eisfeldt and
Papanikolaou (2008) for more details on the construction of this measure. The dependent variables are
ln(assets), ln(sales), and ln(capex + 1). Standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in
parentheses.  * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
A. Low organizational capital: stock of SG&A in bottom quartile at t =  −1 
        B. High organizational capital: stock of SG&A in top quartile at  t  = −1
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Dep. Variable =  S Ln(Assets) Ln(Sales) Ln(Capex+1)
(i) (ii) (iii)
Exposure 0.236*** 0.161* 0.152***
(0.073) (0.083) (0.055)
R‐Squared 0.19 0.18 0.12
Exposure 0.043 0.070 0.068
(0.054) (0.056) (0.049)
R‐Squared 0.44 0.38 0.21
Fixed effects:
   Firm‐cohort X X X
   Year‐cohort X X X
[2,648 firms; 41,789 observations]
Appendix Table A‐VI
Effects of liability exposure based on market share
This table reports coefficients from firm‐panel regressions of firm size and investment on an indicator for
liability exposure, firm‐by‐cohort fixed effects, and year‐by‐cohort fixed effects. The specifications are the
same as those reported in Table III, but Panel A restricts the sample to only firms with a market share,
calculated using sales at the 4‐digit SIC level, in the bottom quartile at time t = ‐1, while Panel B restricts the
sample to only firms with a market share in the top quartile at time t = ‐1. The dependent variables are
ln(assets), ln(sales), and ln(capex + 1). Standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in
parentheses.  * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
A. Low organizational capital: market share in bottom quartile at t =  −1 
[2,648 firms; 29,191 observations]
        B. High organizational capital: market share in top quartile at  t  = −1
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Dep. Variable =
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Low Monitoring 
[inst. ownership 
in bottom 
quartile at t=‐1]
High Monitoring 
[inst. ownership 
in top quartile 
at t=‐1]
Low Monitoring 
[inst. ownership 
in bottom 
quartile at t=‐1]
High Monitoring 
[inst. ownership 
in top quartile 
at t=‐1]
High Bankruptcy Risk 0.346*** 0.193* 0.132 0.092 1,071 580
   [Above median (0.105) (0.099) (0.155) (0.213) 12,484 9,492
    z‐score at t=‐1]
Low Bankruptcy Risk 0.266** 0.025 ‐0.015 0.738** 509 1,000
   [Below median (0.127) (0.110) (0.299) (0.358) 7,222 16,781
    z‐score at t=‐1]
Appendix Table VII
Heterogeneity based institutional ownership and bankruptcy risk
This table reports coefficients from firm‐panel regressions of firm size and payout policy on an indicator for liability exposure, firm‐by‐cohort fixed
effects, and year‐by‐cohort fixed effects. The specifications are the same as those reported in Table III, but Columns (i) and (iii) restrict the sample
to firms with institutional ownership in the bottom quartile while Columns (ii) and (iv) restrict the sample to firms with an institutional ownership in
the top quartile. The estimates reported in the first row further restrict the sample to firms with an above median z‐score, and the estimates
reported in the second row further restrict the sample to firms with a below median z‐score. The dependent variables are ln(assets) and total
payout / assets * 100, where total payout is the sum of dividends and share repurchases. Standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are
reported in parentheses.  * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
Ln(Assets) Total payout / Assets * 100
Number of firms
Number of observations
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Dep. Variable =  s ROA Asset 
Turnover
COGS /      
Sales
SG&A /      
Assets
Ln(Wages)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Exposure 0.001 0.008 ‐0.020 ‐0.004 0.026
(0.010) (0.030) (0.020) (0.007) (0.019)
Observations 138,568 144,650 144,646 144,650 21,379
# of Firms 10,582 10,582 10,582 10,582 2,173
R‐Squared 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.72
Fixed effects:
   Firm‐cohort X X X X X
   Year‐cohort X X X X X
Appendix Table A‐VIII
Effect of liability exposure on firm performance
This table reports coefficients from firm‐panel regressions of firm performance on an indicator for
liability exposure, firm‐by‐cohort fixed effects, and year‐by‐cohort fixed effects. The specifications are
the same as those reported in Table III, but for different dependent variables: ROA, asset turnover,
COGS/sales, SG&A/assets, and ln(wages), where ROA is net income/assets[t‐1] and asset turnover is sales
/ assets. Standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at
10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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